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The Perils of Engagement
A Space for Anthropology in the Age of Security?
by Jonathan Spencer
In the winter of 2006–2007, British anthropologists became embroiled in a series of protests about
a planned research program on “radicalisation” to be jointly funded by the Economic and Social
Research Council and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. By linking research on so-called Islamic
radicalisation to UK intelligence and UK counter-terrorism policy, the program, it was argued, posed
unacceptable levels of risk to other researchers. This paper draws on the author’s role in unsuccessful
attempts to mediate between the academic critics and the funders, contextualized within a fuller
account of the political and ethical implications of researching issues of “security.” The paper con-
cludes with some reflection on the hazards faced by the author’s Sri Lankan colleagues, for whom
issues of security are quite simply matters of life and death.
Pnina Werbner starts off a recent provocative article with the
stark question, “Can there be an engaged public anthropology
of global Islamic terror?” (Werbner 2010:193). Or to put it
another way, can we have an anthropology that engages with
people who think in terms of “global terror” without com-
promising our intellectual agenda, the safety of the people we
work with, our personal safety, and our ethical safeguards?
This paper tells the tale of my experience as an anthropologist
working with the biggest funder of social science research in
the United Kingdom, the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC), on the development of a collaborative re-
search program on issues of security and “radicalisation,” a
program shared with people who behave as if they really do
think in terms of “global terror,” the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office (FCO). The research program in question gen-
erated considerable controversy from the start, and my quix-
otic attempt to persuade the powers that be to rethink its
shape and purpose ended in resignation from the body over-
seeing the program’s development and further protests from
the anthropological community. Parts of my story overlap
with Werbner’s article, but where she expands her argument
to take in issues such as the relationship between anthropology
and journalism, I try to focus on the practical and political
difficulties that follow from the decision to engage when the
circumstances are unpropitious and the institutions you are
engaging with are potentially unattractive.1
My tale, then, is not a happy one, but one reader of an
Jonathan Spencer is Professor of the Anthropology of South Asia
in the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh
(Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15A George Square, Edinburgh EH8
9LD, Scotland [jonathan.spencer@ed.ac.uk]).
early draft of this paper has suggested it is a very British tale
of unhappiness. The institutional structures within which it
takes place and the sheer cosiness of the relations between
government, research agencies, and senior academics are pe-
culiar to the United Kingdom. The policy issues the research
was intended to address are, superficially at least, somewhat
different from those raised by U.S. debates about engagement
with national security agencies. Even the cultural style, the
tortured institutional embarrassment that rules a simple apol-
ogy out of the question, can be seen as somewhat British. Or
so I am told. The issues at stake are issues of ethics and safety
on the one hand, but they are also issues of engagement. Do
we have a responsibility to engage in dialogue with govern-
ment agencies even where we disapprove of their overt pol-
icies? Is there a danger of drifting into irrelevance if we refuse
to engage?2
In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 launch of the Hu-
man Terrain System (HTS) project, the American Anthro-
pological Association (AAA) executive board issued an im-
portant statement that, as is now well known, suggested that
participants in the HTS project might well contravene the
1. There are some minor differences of chronology in Werbner’s ver-
sion of the story but no substantial differences in our interpretation of
what happened and what was at stake.
2. Even assessing what “really” happened in a story like this is far
from straightforward. Many of the documents I used to write this paper
originally reached me by e-mail; others were posted on the Web sites of
different agencies. But, as I discovered late in the editing stage, these are
prone to morph or disappear altogether quite quickly, the evanescent
evidence thus reproducing the more general murk of the story itself. In
this respect readers are cautioned to take the access dates in my footnotes
quite seriously: not everything that could be found on the original dates
is still retrievable.
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AAA code of ethics. There are two points in that statement
that frame the problem addressed in this paper. As well as
raising issues of ethics, HTS threatens the safety of other
anthropologists, and the people studied by anthropologists,
working outside the project. But at the very end of the state-
ment, the board concludes that “anthropology can and in fact
is obliged to help improve U.S. government policies through
the widest possible circulation of anthropological understand-
ing in the public sphere, so as to contribute to a transparent
and informed development and implementation of U.S. pol-
icy by robustly democratic processes of fact-finding, debate,
dialogue, and deliberation.”3 The question I would ask is this:
Is it possible for anthropologists and other critical social sci-
entists to contribute to policy making in the sort of polarized
political landscape created by the Bush and Blair administra-
tions’ contentious military adventures in Iraq and elsewhere?
A Brief History of the ESRC
The United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council
currently spends around £180 million ($360 million) a year
on social science research and training. As well as funding
individual research projects, it also supports linked programs
and specialist research centers. It is by far the biggest source
of support for PhD students in the social sciences. It makes
a very big difference to our lives. In April 2006, the total value
of ESRC research projects across Britain’s 19 or so anthro-
pology departments was £3.6 million (Mills 2006). In my own
department in 2007–2008, with 15 or so full-time academics,
we spent £630,000 of research income, of which £580,000
came from ESRC and its sister organization, the Arts and
Humanities Research Council (AHRC).
Even the name “Economic and Social Research Council”
tells a political tale. The United Kingdom Economic and So-
cial Research Council was originally founded by the Labour
government of the mid-1960s as the Social Science Research
Council (SSRC), taking its place alongside equivalent bodies
for research in medicine and the other sciences. The SSRC’s
status—funded directly from the government’s science budget
but ostensibly independent of political interference—is nicely
summed up in an acronym from those times, QUANGO
(quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization). By the
1970s, the right-wing press had QUANGOs in general and
the SSRC in particular firmly in its sights. As Margaret
Thatcher took control of the Conservative Party, those around
her attacked the SSRC, partly for wasting public money on
3. American Anthopological Association Executive Board state-
ment on the Human Terrain System Project, October 31, 2007.
http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/Statement-on-HTS.cfm
(accessed March 15, 2009).
obviously “frivolous” research projects. A few anthropologists
were caught in the cross fire of these exchanges.4
Within weeks of Thatcher’s election victory in 1979, the
SSRC budget was slashed as a symbolic gesture of Conser-
vative triumph. Two years later a commission was appointed
to investigate the SSRC with a view, it was widely whispered,
to recommend its abolition. The SSRC survived the com-
mission’s report, albeit by agreeing to be renamed as the ESRC
(the claims to “science” in the old title apparently being too
much for one of Thatcher’s ministers). In the years that fol-
lowed it adapted itself to the new political climate, deliberately
moving funding into empirical research (rather than specu-
lative areas of theory) and explicitly pitching the usefulness
of its research to Britain and the British economy (Spencer
2000).
In the course of these adaptations, the ESRC acquired a
rather difficult, often agonistic, relationship with its academic
constituency. Its forms and procedures were famously com-
plex and often baffling. Its policy shifts, especially in graduate
training, often required universities to restructure their own
programs at short notice. Academics developed a substantial,
often rather sullen, folklore around the actant known as the
ESRC, a semi-mythological creature with known likes and
dislikes, expectations, and appetites. Somewhere in all this but
often forgotten by its critics, it continued to support a large
amount of excellent critical social research.
The ESRC’s financial fortunes changed with the election
of Tony Blair in 1997. The new government was enthusiastic
about science in general and especially enthusiastic about the
contribution social science could make to public policy. The
ESRC’s budget doubled in the first decade of New Labour,
as did the number of social researchers employed directly by
central government. “Evidence-based policy” was one cliche´
of the moment. Another was “knowledge transfer,” the need
not merely to learn new things about the world but also to
be more effective in disseminating those new things to people
who could go on to make something useful of them. As
“knowledge transfer” was a key government concern, gov-
ernment departments as well as government-funded research-
ers were both enjoined to show commitments to linking re-
search and practice. Not surprisingly, one of the easiest ways
to set up such commitments was by linking government-
funded research with different bits of government; for ex-
ample, in the 2007–2008 financial year, the ESRC spent £4
million on knowledge transfer and another £7 million on joint
ventures of one kind or another, including a highly successful
program of research projects jointly funded with the De-
partment for International Development.
4. The two anthropological projects I can recall being singled out for
criticism around this time were John Davis’s research on Libyan politics
and economy under Qaddafi and Frances Pine’s work on household and
gender relations in pre-Solidarity Poland (Davis 1987:13). The greater
bulk of criticism, though, was reserved for sociology, a boom subject in
the expansion of British universities in the 1960s and 1970s but which
was seen by the political right as a haven for Marxist propagandists.
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At this point I need to inject a note of positionality, for I
too became a minor player in the social science boom of the
Blair years. In 2001 I was invited to join one of ESRC’s stand-
ing committees, the Training and Development Board. Over
the next 4 years I attended countless ESRC meetings, visited
a dozen or more institutions as part of ESRC teams sent to
check on their graduate training arrangements, assessed ap-
plications of all sorts, and even gave a great deal of my own
time to the Sisyphean task of attempting to redraft some of
the ESRC’s legendarily long and baffling forms.
In all this I learned quite a bit about the ESRC. Early on
I had the revelation that, to paraphrase Margaret Thatcher,
there is no such thing as “the ESRC,” there were just individual
men and women who made decisions on behalf of the ESRC,
nearly all of them sensible and fair-minded academics acting
in good faith as committee members and peer reviewers. The
full-time employees of the ESRC were most often a likeable
bunch—some very able indeed—but all, so far as I could tell,
were trying to be responsive to the needs of the wider social
science community. I did discover one unremarkable thing,
that British social science, taken as a whole, is a creature of
quite limited horizons. It follows that the ESRC, as a micro-
cosm of British social science, inclines to a condition that I
came to call “institutional parochialism.” Like all organiza-
tions, it often turns to the same names and faces that its
officers already know. Academics with experience of carrying
out research beyond Europe or of working in a non-European
language are relatively thinly sprinkled across ESRC’s boards
and committees. In the 1980s, parochialism—the contribu-
tion of any research project to the prosperity of what came
to be called “UK plc” (the equivalent in the United States
would be “UK, Inc.”)—was an explicit policy priority. Pa-
rochialism is not a matter of quite such explicit commitment
any more now that policy makers have discovered the global
and ESRC has set its sights on “the international.” But quite
often it remains part of the habitus of those who work with
and those who work for the ESRC.
Radicalisation
In October 2006 the front page of the Times Higher Education
Supplement carried the headline “Life-Risking ‘Spy’ Plan
Pulled.” The accompanying story concerned a new research
program called “Combating Terrorism by Countering Radi-
calisation,” jointly funded by the ESRC, the AHRC, and the
FCO. A series of papers for the program had been circulating
on the internet in the previous week. Originally they had been
e-mailed to a closed set of would-be applicants for funding
from the program, but someone had forwarded them out into
the world, where their arrival was met by a storm of
consternation.
The specification for the program looked very strange in-
deed. It consisted of a very brief overview paper accompanied
by 10 separate documents, each setting out either a regional
or a country study. Each country or region was introduced
by a crisp financial note (“Budget: up to £100k”), followed
by 20 general questions, some of which appeared in yellow
highlight and bold font. In each case the general questions
were followed by a handful of specific questions for the par-
ticular country, for example,
Pakistan
iv. determine the key issues concerning the general pop-
ulation, including analysis of local v global topics, (to in-
dicate where PREVENT intervention strategies might have
a disproportionate influence); urban v rural; political, social
and economic factors; male v female; age variations; which
groups (political, religious, social protest) are currently driv-
ing the main debates; the impact of globalisation; and ef-
fectiveness, availability and types of representational
structures;
vii. name the key figures (moderate and extreme) and
key groups (including charities and proselytizing religious
groups) influencing the local population on each of the
issues;
and then finally some even more specific questions:
In addition:
• assess the effect of AQ/terrorist propaganda on the wider
population;
• assess the degree to which the armed forces have been
radicalised;
• assess the role of madrassa as radicalising factor;
• to what extent is radicalisation caused by radicalised in-
dividuals from the Pakistani diaspora returning to
Pakistan?
How best to sum up the spirit of this strange assemblage?
It certainly makes very little effort to pander to the usual
niceties of academic argument (“assess the effect of AQ/ter-
rorist propaganda on the wider population”), while readers
unfamiliar with the nuances of UK counter-terrorism strategy
would be hard pressed to make sense of the references to
“PREVENT intervention strategies” and other bits of ad-
vanced security-speak. A strange jumble of typefaces and
highlighting gave the whole thing the feel of an unfinished
draft while, however you look at it, the language and questions
seem to come from somewhere close to the world of
intelligence.
The very ineptness of the presentation invited a certain
healthy derision. As one distinguished historian of the Middle
East put it, “Names, organisational details, social base, con-
tacts . . . you feel they would have asked for map co-ordinates
if they could get away with it.” But the way in which the
documents became public suggested a more worrying agenda.
The original package of documents had been sent out to an
e-mail list of around 80 academics, some from security studies
but most with obvious area-studies connections. They were
accompanied by an invitation to one of two apparently closed
“information seminars” for would-be applicants, one in Ed-
inburgh and one in London.
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Where had all this come from? An internal briefing note
described the program’s rationale pretty clearly:
This is a co-funded initiative with the FCO that will aim to
identify the drivers facilitating radicalisation in three regions
(the Gulf, Central Asia and Southeast Asia) and seven coun-
try case studies identified in the FCO PREVENT strategy
and/or those regarded by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
(JTAC) as current or potential sources of terrorists and ter-
rorism. This will both serve to assist in targeting strategy
and identifying areas where terrorist support or activity is
likely to increase. The project will also examine the success
and failure of counter-strategies that have been deployed in
the various countries to date.5
It quickly became clear that the program had been devel-
oped and sent out into the world without the scrutiny of any
of the ESRC’s various boards and committees. Not only that,
it was unclear if there had been any academic input at all in
preparing the program documents. This seemed a major de-
parture from normal ESRC practice.
The papers for the program escaped from the charmed
circle of the original 80 invitees around October 13, 2006. A
storm of protest followed. There were a number of issues that
were seen to be problematic. At one end of the spectrum, for
some there should be no connection between academic re-
search and agencies like the Foreign Office. Others thought
this connection was defensible, but the link beyond this to
the intelligence agencies represented at JTAC was a step too
far. Specialists objected to the implicit narrative about “rad-
icalisation” which ran through the initial call for applications,
and saw the call as academically compromised in the very
way the problem was framed. There was very wide agreement
that the explicit link between academic research, intelligence,
and counter-terrorism policy, posed serious risks of guilt by
association to all the other researchers in the countries listed,
whether funded by the ESRC, simply working out of UK
institutions, or (like my friend Ravindranath, whose fate I
discuss later in the paper) working with British researchers.
A week later the Times Higher Education Supplement reported
that “the ESRC this week delayed the project to enable further
consultation as a result of serious concerns raised by academ-
ics.”6 The same day, John Gledhill, the chair of the Association
of Social Anthropologists reported to anthropology Heads of
5. According to the UK Government Intelligence Web site: “JTAC was
established in 2003 as part of the development of co-ordinated arrange-
ments for handling and disseminating intelligence in response to the
international terrorist threat. It is a multi-agency unit, staffed by members
of the three Agencies [MI5, MI6 and GCHQ], the Defence Intelligence
Staff and representatives from other relevant departments including the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office, and from the
police.” http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/agencies/jtac.aspx (accessed Oc-
tober 31, 2007). MI5 and MI6 are the domestic and international wings,
respectively, for UK Intelligence. GCHQ is the agency that monitors
communications for intelligence and protects the government’s own data.
6. http://www.thes.co.uk/story.aspx?story_idp2033290 (accessed Oc-
tober 29, 2007).
Department that he had just been told by the chief executive
of the ESRC that the programme had been “pulled.”
Radicalisation: A Critical Reassessment
A few days after the apparent withdrawal of the program, I
was asked by the ESRC if I would help rescue the situation
by finding some way to keep the link between researchers and
the FCO open without fatally upsetting the academic com-
munity. I agreed with some reluctance to get involved.
The ESRC, it quickly turned out, had not decided to “pull”
the program after all. Instead, it had decided to go ahead with
a bigger version of the program but one that was reconfigured
in order to avert any recurrence of the earlier criticisms. Why?
ESRC and AHRC, it was explained to me, had signed up to
the original partnership with FCO for a number of reasons.
Partnerships with government departments were good news
for the research councils in general: it enabled their money
to stretch further, and it won them brownie points in the eyes
of the Treasury. A strategic partnership with FCO at a time
when issues of security and terrorism were very high on the
public agenda would be especially timely. Finally, and cru-
cially, we were in the period immediately before one of the
government’s Comprehensive Spending Reviews (CSRs)—a
once-every-3-years process in which all branches of govern-
ment have to set out their plans for future activity and dis-
cover their allocation of resources for the next 3 years. The
ESRC had done very well in previous CSRs under New La-
bour, but it could not afford to be seen to “let down” the
FCO in such a high-profile policy area so close to the 2008
review.
The redrafting of the program specification was the work
of a committee that grew as the work progressed. The first
meeting was on November 28, 2006, and involved myself, the
chair of ESRC’s Strategic Resources Board (who had taken
charge of the ESRC rescue effort), a senior ESRC staffer, and
a Foreign Office researcher. A larger version of the group—
with a security studies academic who was to act as director
of the relaunched program, two academic representatives
from AHRC programs, another ESRC board member (with
a background in international relations), and John Sidel, pro-
fessor of international politics at the LSE—met on December
8 and again finally on January 9, 2007. Sidel and I were the
only members of the committee who had experience con-
ducting research in the sort of places covered in the original
program specification.7 Both Sidel and I felt that, for all the
7. Sidel had just published a monograph on religious violence in In-
donesia (Sidel 2006). Of the group that worked on the redraft of the
program, he was the only member with any substantial background in
the study of Islamist politics. I had written intermittently over the years
about political violence and about religion and politics in Sri Lanka. I
had just started trying to get a better understanding of the internal
dynamics of Sri Lankan Islam as part of my new project on the role of
religious organizations in the conflict there, but I could hardly claim
established expertise in this area.
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stupidity of the original call for proposals, there were good
reasons to try to keep open channels of communication be-
tween academics and policy makers, even when the academics
were suspicious of the broad direction of policy. Apart from
Sidel, a relative innocent in dealing with the research councils,
the main criterion for inclusion on the committee seemed to
be prior involvement with some other loosely related ESRC
or AHRC committee or program.
Institutional parochialism was, then, a serious constraint
in the redrafting work, but it was a relatively trivial constraint
compared to those presented by FCO. My initial suggestion
was for FCO to withdraw as far as possible from any role in
commissioning the research itself, but instead to be heavily
involved at the dissemination end of the program. Although
fragments of this idea survived into the final specification, the
basic approach was emphatically not what FCO wanted. They
wanted specific answers to their specific questions (and they
were clearly anxious about being associated with public events
at which speakers might just possibly be less than supportive
of the UK government line). The FCO contribution to the
original program budget, it became clear, had been raised
internally on the promise of eliciting quite specific answers
to quite specific questions within a very tight time frame. The
money had to be seen to be spent within the 2007–2008
financial year (or the budgets from which it was raised faced
the possibility of clawback in future years). So there were two
reasons for rushing the redrafting: FCO’s own internal bud-
geting constraints, as well as the research councils’ desire for
their relationship with FCO to be tangible and clearly visible
in time for the spending review.
The specificity of the questions asked was not the only
problem with the first version of the program. As the original
whistle-blowers had pointed out, the whole project seemed
to be based on a set of unexamined assumptions about what
the empirical problem was and how it had to be understood.
The documents tell a simple story. The problem is something
called “radicalisation,” which is a process that happens to
Muslims and which, in its causes, is more or less completely
endogenous to the Muslim population. So, for example, the
South Asia case studies made no reference to discrimination
against Muslims, or anti-Muslim violence in India, no men-
tion of the Kashmir problem or the BJP. Throughout the
documents, Western adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan are
not allowed as legitimate causes of radicalisation (but “the
perception” of them might be). There is no space in that set
of questions for the familiar situation in which a government
or an interest group uses the specter of Jihad as camouflage
for its own more narrowly instrumental experiments in do-
mestic repression. Moreover, the structure of that document
suggested a naive commitment to methodological nationalism
at its battiest. One of the most striking aspects of the kind
of spectacular violence the program sought to understand, as
both Olivier Roy and Faisal Devji have argued, is its deter-
ritorialized nature (Roy 2004; Devji 2005). But the FCO is in
the business of nation-states, so if the FCO has desks in its
office called “Nigeria” or “India,” each of these will serve as
the source of their own questions, and if colonial history
means no one in the office knows much about, say, franco-
phone West Africa, so it is that those countries do not get
questions of their own, whatever may be happening there.
The revised specification that was agreed in January 2007
was of course a compromise between the different interests
in the committee. The original FCO shopping list of questions
and countries was replaced by a much wider (and more co-
herent) geographical remit, with encouragement to research-
ers to think about transnational connections and relation-
ships. Comparative projects were welcomed, although the
attempts to extend the remit beyond Islamic radicals were
less than convincing. It was made clear that the “radicalisa-
tion” narrative might be problematic and should be chal-
lenged where necessary by researchers in the design of their
project. And there were several reassurances about issues of
ethics and risk which Sidel and I had insisted had to be
included in the specification. Early in the document it was
made clear that
New primary research is welcome within the programme,
subject to careful assessment of the potential risks to re-
searchers, research subjects, and other stakeholders. How-
ever, the initiative does not seek to commission long-term
in-country fieldwork in highly sensitive parts of the world.
In addition,
The Research Councils expect all applications for funding
to be prepared in accordance with the ESRC Research Ethics
Framework. The topics to be investigated within this pro-
gramme may pose special methodological, political and eth-
ical challenges and the Commissioning Panel will expect
proposals to address these challenges explicitly. In particular
it will be looking for candid assessments of possible harm
or risk, and imaginative methodological responses to these
assessments. Risks need to be assessed for a wide range of
potential stakeholders - research subjects, researchers them-
selves, other governmental and non-governmental agencies,
and other social researchers working in the region. There
are particular risks associated with research access in certain
parts of the world, and research which might threaten the
long-term viability of other researchers’ work in particular
settings will not be funded.8
All that was left was the addition of a paragraph from FCO
setting out its relationship to the program. The FCO para-
graph arrived a few weeks after everything else had been
agreed, with the warning that the text was non-negotiable. It
started unpromisingly:
The FCO is committed to outstanding research in support
of policy making. The FCO’s interest in this initiative stems
8. ESRC “New Security Challenges: ‘Radicalisation’ and Violence—A
Critical Reassessment. Specification,” March 2007.
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from the recognition that independent, high-quality re-
search on radicalisation issues is vitally important to sup-
porting and informing UK Counter Terrorism policy over-
seas. In support, in particular, of the Prevent strand of that
policy,9 the FCO seeks to use research to increase its knowl-
edge and understanding of the factors associated with rad-
icalisation in those countries and regions identified as high
priority.
Sidel and I immediately objected on the grounds that by
explicitly making the research program part of a wider coun-
terterrorism policy, this particular paragraph would undo all
the work that had gone into the redrafting and pretty much
guaranteed further objections. We were supported in this by
other members of the committee. Although a few small con-
cessions were made in the days that followed—the final ver-
sion omitted reference to research “supporting” UK counter-
terrorism policy, and the rather creepy reference to “the
Prevent strand” was expanded and fleshed out—what arrived
in late January was pretty much what came out in the final
specification in March.10
When the word came that the program would be launched
with the FCO link to counterterrorism intact, Sidel and I
formally resigned from the committee and sent one final mes-
sage out to the governing council of ESRC and AHRC. In
that message we concentrated on the issue of risk and the
necessity to keep some visible distance between the explicit
agenda of academic researchers and the agenda of the British
government in counter-terrorism policy. We have never re-
ceived any reply or formal acknowledgment for this message.
The program was launched. The ESRC was inundated with
protests from senior academic figures and from professional
bodies. Research was commissioned, although key areas in
the world (Europe and South Asia) were covered by non-
academic research bodies (Demos and the International Crisis
Group), suggesting that few established academics working
in those regions had responded to the call.
Implications
Of course the big shadow of the war haunts all of this, making
it hard to separate everyday infelicities from the grand designs
of geopolitical conflict. One of the many depressing legacies
of the neocon moment in U.S. foreign policy is the credibility
9. For more information on the Government’s Counter-Terrorism
Strategy and the Prevent strand, see http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/
counter-terrorism-strategy/ (footnote from original).
10. The full text was found at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/
opportunities/current_funding_opportunities/New_Security_Challenges
.aspx?ComponentIdp18575&SourcePageIdp5433 (accessed November
27, 2007).
it has given to conspiracy theory as a mode of explanation.11
In what follows I shall set out some of the implications—
ethical, practical, intellectual and political—of the story I have
attempted to tell. I shall concentrate on three clustered sets
of issues. One is politics, in terms of the political justification
for funding research about other people and their politics.
Security would seem a powerful card to play on behalf of
social scientists interested in out-of-the-way places, but can
we live with the consequences of framing research in terms
of security? A second is ethics, in the now conventional (but
often counter-intuitive) sense of procedures, codes, and com-
mittees. My third concerns the virtue of disengagement, an
academic luxury that I suggest is a source of critical purchase
we take too easily for granted.
Politics
There is a longer story here. In September 2006, just before
the first row blew up, the Guardian Education section carried
a short report detailing the ways in which the research coun-
cils, and AHRC in particular, were planning to use “security”
as a key issue in their bids for the next government spending
round. Under the heading “Terror studies: security could open
funding doors,” the article concluded
There is reason to take the government’s interest in terror-
ism research seriously. The research councils, more than
ever, have to answer to the Treasury about the usefulness
of the research they fund. A security angle may be just the
crutch they need to justify parting with their sought-after
cash.12
What are the implications for a discipline such as anthro-
pology of such an approach? Is there a place for us in an age
of security? What happens to our practice if we engage with
programs, such as the radicalisation program, that essentially
single out a whole segment of the population as researchable
in the name of “security”? I would like to be able to say that
what you get in this situation is likely to be bad anthropology,
but I can sense the ghost of Evans-Pritchard shaking his head
even as I say it (cf. Van der Veer 2010). From the 1920s
onward, a great deal of the material support for anthropo-
logical research has been justified in terms of supporting pol-
icies—indirect rule, anti-communism—we might now feel
somewhat uncomfortable with. Is “security,” as a rationale
11. For a very different take on the project—one which in my view
overestimates the coherence and consistency linking different interven-
tions—see Jeremy Keenan’s commentary in Anthropology Today (Keenan
2007). Keenan’s central claim, that the initial ESRC-FCO call was “de-
signed to meet the needs of [FCO’s] US ally” (2007:26) and specifically
to inform interventions in the Sahara-Sahel that he documents elsewhere
in his article, is puzzling when we remember that the original call made
no specific mention of Islamist activity in southern Algeria and the neigh-
boring region.
12. “Terror studies: security could open funding doors.” Guardian,
September 5, 2006. http://education.guardian.co.uk/egweekly/story/
0,,1864526,00.html (accessed November 5, 2007).
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for funding research, any different from its Cold War
predecessors?
Three points can be made here. The first is that our col-
leagues in international relations, political science, and to
some extent development studies do not completely share our
qualms, even when they share our politics. The demise of the
Cold War opened the way for a new wave of so-called critical
security studies, work that seeks to unmask the rhetoric of
security as well as investigate the apparatus of security. A great
deal of this research has been concentrated on Europe and
European topics, but recently a further critical strand has
appeared in development studies, a strand that questions the
rhetoric of human security and so-called humanitarian in-
terventions as modes of global governance. The first strand
is identified with the Copenhagen School gathered round Ole
Waever, the second with figures from development studies
such as Mark Duffield (e.g., C.A.S.E. Collective 2006; Duffield
2005). But however critical these strands of research, in the
end their object of study is usually the apparatus of security
itself, not the men and women defined in advance as a po-
tential problem for “security,” nor the implications of making
the very process of research itself part of the apparatus of
security.13 And it is unclear how stable the “critical” perspec-
tive is, now that a new Manichean divide has replaced the
old Cold War divisions between friend and enemy.
The second point is that the use of security as a rationale
for supporting research has different implications in different
institutional settings. In the United States, the old Cold War
programs such as Title VI—which provides much of the sup-
port for training in non-Western languages in American uni-
versities—have been around so long they have long since been
“domesticated” by liberal academics (to the occasional rage
and consternation of conservative critics such as Stanley
Kurtz).14 Historically, Britain’s approach to funding research
in the more out-of-the-way corners of the world has been
less systematic and much more ad hoc. This means that re-
sources cannot simply be routed through tried and tested
conduits: instead, structures have to be created to address the
real or imagined needs of the policy crowd.
Third, up to this point I have been working with a rather
simple-minded idea of “engagement” and of the usefulness
and potential instrumentalization of academic knowledge. If
Mosse’s recent brilliant analyses of the place of “policy” in
development work (Mosse 2005, 2006) expose the ways in
13. The Prevent strategy, which aims to anticipate acts of violence by
building better sources of information within local Muslim communities
and which was a very new initiative at the time of the original ESRC-
FCO call, has since been heavily criticized for its inherent stigmatization
of all Muslims as potential terrorists (e.g., Kundnani 2009). The cack-
handed logic that makes Prevent counter-productive for community re-
lations initiatives also makes it fatal for research practices that rely on a
degree of trust between researcher and researched.
14. S. Kurtz. Studying Title VI. National Review Online, June 16, 2003.
http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz061603.asp (accessed March
16, 2009).
which the language of policy does not inform on-the-ground
practice, so it is that many researchers have stories of the ways
in which their findings, although commissioned by policy
makers, were adroitly ignored if they challenged the current
political orthodoxy. In this case, the main point of the project
for all the participants was not what might be discovered
about the world, still less the difference it would make to
future policy. What mattered was opening up certain rela-
tionships and keeping those relationships alive.
Through all the tortured arguments about the “radicali-
sation” initiative, I was puzzled why ESRC had clung so tightly
to their rather shaky relationship with FCO, even when it was
clear that this was doing serious damage to their reputation
in the academic community. The answer emerged little by
little in late 2007 and early 2008. In November 2007 Gordon
Brown made his first explicit allusion to the ESRC project in
a House of Commons statement on national security. Out-
lining what he called a “generational challenge,” Brown
promised
Building on initial roadshows of mainstream Islamic schol-
arship round the country, which have already attracted more
than 70,000 young people, and an internet site which has
reached far more, we will sponsor at home and then abroad,
including for the first time in Pakistan, a series of national
and local events to counter extremist propaganda. The next
stage will draw upon the work commissioned by the Eco-
nomic and Social Research Council, King’s College and the
Royal Society for Arts on how best to deal with radicalisation
at home and abroad.15
A few weeks later, it was announced that “global security”
was one of four interdisciplinary research themes that were
to receive huge ring-fenced budgets in the Research Councils
rewards from the Comprehensive Spending Review.16 This, I
realized, was the elephant in the room when we were drafting
our revised program specification. It was not the FCO pro-
gram itself that mattered, it was the fact that security was a
theme at the very heart of the Research Councils’ bid for
funding for the next 5 years. If the FCO collaboration failed
on the eve of this funding decision, a much bigger plan might
collapse with it. In March 2008, the government published
its national security strategy document, which identified what
it called a “diverse but interconnected set of threats”:
They include international terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and
trans-national crime. These and other threats and risks are
driven by a diverse and interconnected set of underlying
15. Gordon Brown “Statement on National Security.” November 14,
2007. http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page13757.asp (accessed No-
vember 27, 2007).
16. Melanie Newman, “Major Fillip for Research,” Times Higher Education
Supplement, December 14, 2007. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/
story.asp?sectioncodep26&storycodep310161 (accessed March 15,
2009).
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factors, including climate change, competition for energy,
poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and
globalisation.17
And the Research Councils announced the details of their
£113 million 10-year program on “global uncertainties” at the
same time. The program was to be coordinated by ESRC and
genially if rather counter-intuitively bundled “terrorism” in
with “poverty” and “climate change” in a rather precise copy
of the government’s security strategy themes.
Ethics
Two years before this all happened ESRC had unveiled a new
set of requirements for ethical overview of the research it
funds. In a characteristically weighty and characteristically
prescriptive document, the ESRC Research Ethics Framework
(REF) sets out some minimal procedural requirements for
handling ethical issues in social research.18 At the heart of this
is a committee structure for ethical review that must be
adopted by all research institutions under ESRC’s remit. The
FCO radicalisation row was one of the first opportunities to
put the framework to the test, and ESRC was quick to point
to it in their response to critics of the programme: “We have
already identified some of the potential ethical issues for pro-
jects under this programme and we will be reminding insti-
tutions that they need to make sure that their ethics com-
mittees have the relevant expertise to judge projects under
this initiative.”19
While this structure might be thought to provide reassur-
ance to those concerned about the ethical implications of
individual projects, it completely fails to address the question
of ESRC’s own responsibilities in this area. It turns out that
the ESRC Research Ethics Framework has very little to say
about risk to researchers and makes no reference whatsoever
to the ethical responsibilities of the ESRC itself. In the world
as conceived in the ESRC REF, ESRC is not an ethical agent,
and its actions have no ethical implications or effects in the
world. In effect, ESRC stands completely outside its own fa-
vored machinery of ethical governance, and therefore has no
sense that its own decision-making requires ethical scrutiny.
This makes perfect sense in terms of the institutional pol-
itics of the world of ethics committees, whose remit is as
much to do with protecting institutions from legal challenge
as it is to do with anything covered by the everyday sense of
“ethics.” In this situation, invocation of the Research Ethics
Framework is ESRC’s own way of saying it cannot be deemed
responsible for anything that happens in the course of the
program: it has required individual research organizations to
17. National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an
Interdependent World (National Security Strategy 2008:3).
18. http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/opportunities/research
_ethics_framework/ (accessed November 22, 2007).
19. This passage was used in a string of near-identical letters sent out
from ESRC in response to objections from disciplinary associations and
individual researchers.
put procedures in place, and this is ESRC’s guarantee of eth-
ically correct research practice. Structurally, this resembles the
figure of sovereignty as sketched by Carl Schmitt (and more
recently Giorgio Agamben): the sovereign stands outside the
law, so sovereignty cannot itself be bound to the law (Agam-
ben 1998; Schmitt 1985 [1922], 1996 [1932]). But while that
might seem to get ESRC off the hook by passing responsibility
down the chain to individual research organizations, what if
something does indeed happen that can be traced back to a
decision of ESRC’s? How can ESRC demonstrate its own non-
culpability? The answer is that it cannot do this within its
own structures and procedures. This became apparent as soon
as we raised the question of risk to researchers after the ap-
pearance of the FCO paragraph. Sidel and I could not get
anyone on the ESRC side to respond in a substantive way to
this particular issue. Subsequent attempts by the professional
associations to engage in dialogue on the topic of risk were
similarly frustrated. Having refused to acknowledge the ex-
istence of an issue, ESRC could not talk about it without
admitting their earlier refusal.
This aspect of the story should raise troublesome issues for
those colleagues who believe that tighter ethical codes are the
best answer to the securitization of anthropology and the
other human sciences. My experience of ESRC’s own use of
its Research Ethics Framework as a shield against criticism is
one, but by no means the only, reason for my scepticism
about those procedures which have recently been felicitously
described as the “new bureaucracies of virtue” (Jacob and
Riles 2007; cf. Lederman 2006). ESRC’s Research Ethics
Framework, concerned as it is with the protection of insti-
tutions from external challenge, offers no assurance to those
concerned about the behavior of other researchers, or about
the irresponsible actions of funding agencies. Moreover a
strict insistence on informed consent and the protection of
the interests of research participants would make it very dif-
ficult for me to write this paper. At the first meeting I attended
with representatives from ESRC and FCO, I explained that I
was only able to play a role in the rescue operation if every-
thing—all discussions, agreements, and disagreements—were
frankly recorded, open, and transparent. If anything went
wrong later, I wanted it to be clear who had done and said
what. I regard that opening speech as a license to tell my tale
now that the dust has settled, but no one has signed a consent
form, and I doubt very much they would agree to participate
if I had offered them that option before we started our drafting
meetings. In truth I see the interests of at least some of the
“research subjects,” if that is what the FCO and ESRC officials
are in my story, as openly antagonistic to the interests of the
community I see as the primary audience for this paper—my
academic colleagues in anthropology and area studies.
The Privilege of Disengagement
Why did I ever agree to get involved? Personally, I was es-
pecially dismayed by the extraordinary clumsiness and, for
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want of a better term, stupidity of the original program. But
I felt that policy makers in this area need more and better
communications with academic experts, including anthro-
pologists in some cases.20 This, of course, is not quite the
same thing as presenting academic researchers with shopping
lists from MI5; in attempting to use academic researchers as
proxy intelligence agents, or so it seemed, the danger was that
academics would withdraw from all engagement with agencies
such as FCO. I was also concerned that the furore might
weaken what limited authority anthropology might claim as
a source of insight on politics in general and political violence
in particular.
Here is one story that ran parallel with my involvement in
the ESRC/FCO fiasco, and partly explains these motives. In
December 2006, with a small group of colleagues from Japan,
Norway, and Sri Lanka, I helped organize a training workshop
at the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka. For 2 days we
worked with a group of junior and senior academic staff from
three Sri Lankan institutions: Peradeniya itself, which is the
oldest university in the country and which, while predomi-
nantly Sinhala Buddhist in its makeup, includes a significant
number of Muslim and Tamil students; Eastern University in
Batticaloa, which had just celebrated its twentieth anniversary
and which is now almost entirely Tamil; and Southeastern
University in Oluvil, which had split away from Eastern at
the height of Tamil-Muslim tension in the East in the 1990s
and which is now almost entirely Muslim. The workshop was
organized as part of a new consortium project designed to
encourage cooperation in social science capacity building be-
tween the three institutions and that had been set up with an
explicit goal to “de-ethnicize” the country’s universities,
which had become de facto zones of segregation in the years
of civil war. Its theme was conducting social research in crisis
situations.
The workshop itself was, in my view, a brilliant and heart-
warming success, with groups of senior and junior researchers,
from all ethnic backgrounds, working up research designs on
pressing local topics. (My favorite was a proposed piece of
research on the everyday experience of crossing security
checkpoints in the contested areas of the East.) I was partic-
ularly pleased to welcome the Vice Chancellor of Eastern
University, Professor Ravindranath, to the workshop. Ravee,
as he was known to his friends, had been having a hard time
recently. The campus of his university was bang in the middle
20. In his response to Werbner’s article, Robert Hefner (2010) makes
the point that anthropologists in the United States did engage with the
dangerous simplifications guiding foreign policy after 9/11, and while the
policy remained intact, the anthropological contribution did make a dif-
ference of sorts (Hefner 2010). Charles Tripp, a distinguished scholar of
Iraq, has a gloomier assessment of the impact of academic knowledge in
his account of a specially arranged briefing for Tony Blair and his senior
ministers on the eve of the invasion: “Blair seemed wholly uninterested
in Iraq as a complex and puzzling political society, wanting confirmation
merely that deposing Saddam Hussein would remove ‘evil’ from the
country” (Tripp 2007:30).
of one of the most volatile areas of the country, and in the
previous 2 years, rival paramilitary factions had been com-
peting for symbolic control of the institution.21 A few months
earlier, someone had abducted the Dean of the Faculty of
Arts. When he was released 10 days later, with a chilling
message from his captors that his Vice Chancellor should
resign immediately or face the consequences, the Dean
promptly left his job and fled the country. Since then Ravee
had also left the campus and had been trying to carry out
his job from the capital, Colombo, over 100 miles away from
the university itself.
A few days after the workshop, on Friday, December 15, I
was traveling in a car with another academic friend, who took
a series of calls on his mobile phone. These concerned Ravee’s
security arrangements: my friend had been using his own
contacts with senior members of the security forces to get a
better sense of who they thought were behind the threats
Ravee had been receiving, and he called Ravee to pass on what
he had learned. Two hours later, on his way out of an academic
meeting in central Colombo, Ravee disappeared. He has never
been seen again.
My colleagues and I reacted as best we could to Ravee’s
disappearance. Having checked with Ravee’s family, we put
together a letter calling for his release and, with the aid of
the internet, swiftly assembled 100 signatures from prominent
academic figures across the world. Amnesty International is-
sued a statement, as did the U.S.-based Scholars at Risk pro-
gram. After a slow start, the international media caught up
with the story. My colleagues from Norway and Japan made
early and frequent contact with senior figures in their foreign
ministries and embassies. But I found it embarrassingly dif-
ficult to get hold of anyone who could help at the British
High Commission in Colombo. Eventually, after a frustrating
week in which messages were not passed on and e-mails were
not answered, I called my MP in his office in Edinburgh, and
he promised to put an immediate call through to the FCO
minister most involved with Sri Lankan issues.
I have four reasons for closing with this story. First, it
reminds us of the terrible danger some of our friends and
colleagues live with in trying to keep alive their universities
and research institutes in the context of war and everyday
terror. Visitors like myself, who can walk away from the sit-
uation when it suits, have a profound responsibility to protect
those whose hospitality makes our own work possible. Sec-
ond, it illustrates why those visitors might sometimes benefit
from quick access to representatives of our foreign ministry.
It was very striking how much better the Norwegians and
Japanese seemed to be at keeping communications open be-
tween their foreign ministries and academics with local ex-
21. I allude to this poisonous sociality in the closing chapter of a
recent book (Spencer 2007), written just before Ravindranath was ab-
ducted. For a fuller account see Walker (2010).
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pertise.22 Third, in retrospect I am struck by how unprepared
and—frankly—unskilled I was in this situation. As rumours
and messages came back to us in murky ways in the weeks
that followed Ravee’s disappearance, apparently straightfor-
ward “correct” gestures took on more worrying implications.
The international publicity had rattled the group holding Ra-
vee, we were told; they were worried that if he was released
there would be yet more unwelcome attention. Before re-
leasing him, they were said to be seeking reassurances he
would leave the country and keep quiet about what had hap-
pened. In that case, had our open letter to the press, with its
glittering signatories, made his situation worse? Another story,
which dented the warm liberal glow that attended the success
of our December workshop, was that the abductors had been
excited by the evidence of Ravee’s international collabora-
tions: one motive for the abduction was to get their hands
on the endless flow of kroner, yen and pounds that must be
on its way to him from such well-positioned supporters. Did
that mean all our efforts and plans to help build capacity in
war-affected parts of the university system were only going
to endanger the lives of the people we were working with?
“In the social sciences,” Bourdieu (1990:1) reminds us, “the
progress of knowledge presupposes progress in our knowledge
of the conditions of knowledge.” Indeed. In writing this paper
I have deliberately tried to take on the challenge posed by
Harper and Corsı´n-Jime´nez (2005:11), who make a strong
case for anthropologists to commit to “the possibility of eth-
ical uncertainty,” an uncertainty grounded in our awareness
of the limits of our knowledge of any political or ethical field.
If I felt I was unskilled in finding my way through this deadly
situation, I felt equally unskilled in maneuvering my way in
the far-from-transparent world of ESRC and FCO. The de-
cisions I made in hindsight seem too often to be based on
misapprehensions of what was at stake, of who was doing
what, or of the institutional constraints within which we were
operating. As such, too much emphasis on individual ethical
judgment rather misses the point: judgment operates in a
field that is intersubjective, saturated with the workings of
power, and never based on perfect knowledge of an ethically
simple situation.23 The best we can hope for is not so much
being “right” but simply being “less wrong” than the last time.
Appeals to ethical codes and the other safe boundaries we
generate to keep virtuous “us” safely removed from unvir-
tuous “them” deaden our ability to reflect on ethics as a kind
of skilled practice.
Fourth and finally, Ravee’s fate reminds us of the privilege
of non-engagement. One of the striking features of the sit-
uation at Eastern University was the way in which local po-
22. At that time the Nowegian special envoy to support the floundering
peace process in Sri Lanka was a trained anthropologist with many years
experience in applied work, Jon Hanssen-Bauer.
23. Just such a presumption of ethical simplicity lies at the heart of
Scheper-Hughes’s “rivetingly intemperate” (Laidlaw 2002:327, n.2) but
much-cited article on the project of a “militant anthropology” (Scheper-
Hughes 1995).
litical entanglements and alignments seeped into all aspects
of university life. Undoubtedly Ravee wanted his university
to be “engaged” in matters of local importance and to act as
a center for resources and expertise in the area. One of our
first conversations had been about the way in which the big
international NGOs had completely ignored local researchers
and local expertise in their response to the tsunami in 2004.
But to be effective, that kind of engagement is in fact premised
on disengagement at another level. To be useful as a source
of critical knowledge in times of political and humanitarian
disaster, researchers such as Ravee had to be able to operate
as far as they could outside the agonistic claims of local pol-
itics. That kind of disengagement and the freedom for critical
research it affords is a privilege most researchers in the global
North too easily take for granted.
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